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Abstract. In this paper, we measure market access between the United States, the EU,
and Japan (the Triad), using the effect of national borders on trade patterns. We
investigate overall and industry-level trends of bilateral trade openness and provide
explanations for those using proxies for bilateral observed protection (tariffs and
NTBs), home bias of consumers, product differentiation, and levels of FDI. The
explanations related to actual protection, home bias and substitutability of goods put
together explain a large part of the border effect between blocs of the Triad, although
they do not explain the whole of the border effect puzzle. JEL classification: F12, F15
Commerce dans la Triade : jusqu’a` quel point l’acce`s aux grands marche´s est il facile? Cet
article mesure le niveau d’inte´gration commerciale entre les pays de l’UE, le Japon et les
Etats-Unis (la Triade) en utilisant l’effet des frontie`res nationales sur le commerce
international. Nous e´tudions le niveau et l’e´volution du degre´ d’ouverture bilate´ral
ainsi que les diffe´rentes explications possibles des effets frontie`re estime´s qui sont teste´es
a` l’aide de variables capturant la protection (tarifs et BNTs), le biais domestique des
consommateurs, le degre´ de diffe´renciation des produits et les niveaux d’IDE bilate´raux.
Les explications lie´es a` la protection, au biais domestique et a` la substituabilite´ entre
produits, conside´re´es ensemble, expliquent une bonne partie de l’effet frontie`re entre
pays de la Triade, meˆme si elles n’expliquent pas la totalite´ de l’e´nigme.
1. Introduction
The debate over the measurement of the ‘true’ level of the protection in
Europe, in comparison with one of its main trading partners has recently
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been fuelled by diverging empirical evidence. According to Messerlin (2001),
Europe has a high level of protection, which translates into a sizeable efficiency
cost, estimated to represent one year of Spanish GDP. In contrast, recent work
conducted by Boue¨t et al. (2004) presents a very different picture. Relying on
applied tariffs and having properly calculated tariff equivalents of tariff quotas
and specific tariffs, added anti-dumping duties, and taken into account the
intricate EU preference schemes, they do not find Europe to be much more
protectionist than the United States. The reason for this is quite simple: The
EU has developed a myriad of preferential schemes with a vast number of
partners in the world (mostly developing countries) and enforces MFN tariffs
only towards a limited number of trade partners, among which Japan and the
United States are the primary concerns.
However, this evidence associated with a direct measure of protection
remains questionable. First, average tariff figures mask a reality plagued with
numerous tariff peaks (Hoekman, Francis, and Olarreaga 2002). The asso-
ciated dispersion in tariffs has led to the diagnosis of ‘unfinished business’
concerning market access reached by the WTO in a recent report (WTO 2002).
Second, tariffs applied to different exporters by a given importer can vary
widely: This is another dimension of the dispersion in tariffs. Being less
protectionist on average can hide a highly distortive trade policy in which
exports of ‘non-preferred’ efficient trade partners are deterred. Lastly, even
limited tariffs can be protective if the price elasticity of imports is sufficiently
large.
Considering this background of large and persistent difficulties in the direct
measurement of protection, an indirect assessment of protection policies can be
contemplated. As detailed in the recent survey on trade costs proposed by
Anderson and van Wincooop (2004), international price differentials/distor-
tions and deviations from expected trade patterns are two alternative research
strategies to measure those trade costs.
Among the recent studies using the first strategy, Bradford (2003) relies on a
detailed comparison of prices within the OECD (associated with Purchasing
Power Parity calculations by the OECD) in order to derive price differentials
between domestic and world markets. He concludes that protection levels
revealed by this method are very large and disproportionately larger than
those suggested by the simple measurement of tariffs.
The second strategy based on deviations from expected trade patterns uses
different versions of the gravity equation as the benchmark of what trade
volumes ‘should be.’ There is a large and old empirical literature on this
topic, which has been focused, in particular, on assessing the impact of
regional integration on trade flows (Frankel 1997 is an example of such a
study with very large coverage of regional agreements). This type of work has
been recently renewed in two related respects: first, through a narrowing of the
gap between the empirical investigations and its theoretical foundations (see
notably Feenstra 2003 for one of the most complete overview of the theoretical
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foundations of the gravity equation); second, through the emergence of the
border effect literature. This methodology inverts the logic in the measurement
of international commodity markets’ integration. Let us take the example of
two countries supposed to be highly integrated, the United States and Canada.
How can one assess precisely the level of this integration? The border effect
literature initiated by McCallum (1995), Helliwell (1996), and Wei (1996) does
so by comparing their bilateral trade with the volume of trade taking place
within their own borders, not with trade flows occurring between other pairs of
countries chosen as a reference group, as was done traditionally in gravity
equation approaches. The results have consistently shown strikingly low levels
of international integration. Even the latest work by Anderson and van
Wincoop (2003), focused on correcting an upward bias in the original
McCallum estimate, shows that the U.S.A-Canada border makes 1993 trade
between Canadian provinces 10 times larger than trade with U.S. states, every-
thing else equal. This figure of impeding factor of national borders inside the
European Union in the mid-1990s was still estimated to be between 6 (Chen,
2004) and 13 (Head and Mayer, 2000). Nitsch (2000) provides an intermediate
estimate of 10, still a very high figure for a supposedly perfectly integrated
market since 1993.
Our paper’s first addition to the literature is the provision of estimates of
reciprocity in market access for multiple bilateral combinations of trade part-
ners that constitute a very significant part of world trade.1 We assess in more
detail the current level of integration of international markets and its evolu-
tion. We use trade flows between and within countries of the Triad (the United
States, Japan, and each member state of the European Union) to evaluate the
overall effect of national borders for those partners and, most important,
whether we can observe some significant asymmetries in this (inverse) measure
of integration. This question of symmetry in market access has been the subject
of numerous concerns, especially among policymakers, with probably the most
famous case being the recurrent claims by U.S. officials at the end of the 1980s
of high protection restricting access of American exporters to the Japanese
market for several industries. A newly available dataset of compatible bilateral
trade and production enables a rigorous analysis of those and related claims
over the period 1976–99 and for 26 industries.
A second point of this paper is to sort out the possible explanations of
border effects estimated across country pairs and industries. Several causes of
the border effects have been designated in the literature. The first obvious one
relates to actual protection, should it be through tariffs or more subtle border-
related trade hindrances. National borders can also coincide with delimitations
of important differences in tastes among consumers, resulting in a home bias,
which can give insights into the observed fall of trade volumes at the border.
1 A calculation using the United Nations’ COMTRADE database shows that our sample
(all trade flows are combinations between the EU12 countries, the United States, and Japan)
represented 42% of world trade in manufactured goods in 2001.
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Another possible explanation that has been little tested yet is the importance of
foreign direct investment. European countries usually import very small
volumes of American cars (even those cars that have the size and fuel con-
sumption characteristics that actually make them suitable for European streets
and fuel prices). Those ‘missing imports’ can result alternatively from actual
protection by EU countries or from a home bias of EU consumers. However, it
can also be argued that the important production of cars taking place within
Europe in plants owned by American firms limits the actual ‘need’ for import-
ant trade flows. It is also likely that this last explanation is not independent
from the two former ones: The theoretical and empirical literature on FDI/
export decisions suggests that American firms may have decided to produce on
European soil because of a combination of high trade protection and the
imperative adaptation of American cars to local tastes and needs.
Distinguishing between alternative explanations of border effects is an
important public policy issue in that actual tariffs and other protective devices’
cuts can be negotiated in the multilateral arena, whereas differences in tastes
and bilateral FDI patterns are less subject to such negotiations.
Apart from the border effects literature, our paper is also strongly related to
the set of articles providing rigorous measures of symmetry in bilateral open-
ness, on the one hand, and to the papers measuring the impact of protection,
most notably tariffs on trade patterns. Both sets of papers are growing, but are
still rather small. Concerning symmetry, Harrigan (1996) estimates bilateral
difficulties in market access and finds some asymmetry for the countries we
analyse here: overall, the EU seems more closed to Japanese and U.S. imports
than the reverse. Harrigan and Vanjani (2003) focus on Japanese trade flows
and give insightful results about the long-term patterns for this country often
considered as an outlier in international trade. Using a framework, a dataset,
and a specification very comparable to ours, their results notably point out
that the United States is structurally more closed to Japanese exports than the
reverse (especially since the beginning of the 1990s). They do not, however,
provide many empirical explanations for this finding. Head and Mayer (2002a)
investigate a potential ‘fortress Europe’ effect during the European trade
integration process. Using the border effects methodology, they measure the
extent of additional difficulty in European markets access faced by Japanese
and American producers. The authors find little evidence of a fortress Europe
effect with respect to American exporters, but more suspicion seems warranted
for imports of some specific Japanese goods. Here again, there is no second
step that would explain the variance in border effects across country pairs and
industries with protection-related variables.
Concerning papers that estimate the impact of observed measures of protec-
tion on trade patterns, Harrigan (1993) is an early example that finds that
tariffs still matter: tariffs are found to have a large import-reducing effect
(much larger than non-tariff barriers) for OECD countries in 1983. More
recently, Lee and Swagel (1997) use a simultaneous equation approach to
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study the reciprocal interaction between trade flows and trade barriers. They
find mixed results for the impact of both tariffs and NTBs on trade flows but
use total industry-level imports rather than bilateral flows. Hummels (2001),
Head and Ries (2001), Lai and Trefler (2002), and Romalis (2004) are exam-
ples of recent papers that use information on bilateral tariff rates at a detailed
industry level to estimate price elasticities. The revealed effects of tariff protec-
tion on trade are large, with an implied elasticity of substitution in the under-
lying CES demand structure at 5.3 for Lai and Trefler (2002), 5.6 for Hummels
(2001), 7.9 for Head and Ries (2001), and between 8 and 10 for Romalis (2004).
Those results point to the empirical relevance of a simple solution to the border
effect puzzle suggested by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000): Even low levels of
protection at the border can have large trade-dampening effects if price elasti-
cities are sufficiently large. We investigate this claim further here by using
tariffs and NTBs as potential explanations for the border effect in our sample
of countries.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Theoretical underpinnings and
related methodological issues are detailed in section 2. Section 3 gives results of
our estimations, with section 3.1 presenting the results pooled over all
industries. Detailed results at the industry level are examined in section 3.2.
Finally, the respective impact of tariffs and other obstacles to trade are disen-
tangled in section 4.
2. Measuring international market openness with border effects.
2.1. The model and estimable equation
Our empirical work consists of bilateral trade volumes estimations with a
gravity-like specification derived (originally by Wei 1996 and followed by
many others) from the now standard monopolistic competition trade model
of Krugman (1980). It has been demonstrated recently by Anderson and van
Wincoop (2003) that a proper derivation of the gravity equation from theory is
crucially important for the validity of empirical results, especially in the case of
border effects estimation. Monopolistic competition is not the only available
model that can be used to derive the gravity equation (see Evenett and Keller
2003 for a global overview of conditions giving rise to the gravity equation),
but it seems more natural in our case, which focuses on trade between some of
the most industrialized countries in the world. This model combines CES
utility with iceberg trade costs and non-strategic price-setting behaviour by
firms. It is straightforward to show that this model yields the following
compact characterization of trade patterns between country i and country j
for a given industry (Head and Mayer 2000):
mij
mii
¼ aij
aii
 1
pj
pi
 
ij
ii
 1
vj
vi
 
; ð1Þ
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where mij denotes imports of i from j and aij represent i’s consumers’ prefer-
ences with respect to varieties produced in j. During trade pj, the mill price in
country j, is shifted up by a transaction cost  ij, giving delivered price
pij ¼  ijpj. Finally, vi is the value of production of the considered industry in
i. Functional forms for delivered prices (pij) and preferences (aij) have to be
specified in order to obtain an estimable equation.
Trade costs are a function of distance (dij, which proxies for transport costs)
and the level of protection of i, which can consist of an ad valorem tariff tij and
the ad valorem equivalent of non-tariff barriers NTBij (intended to incorporate
all protectionist measures that are not the direct ad valorem tariffs we observe
in the empirics).
pij ¼ ijpj  dijð1þ tijÞð1þ NTBijÞpj:
The structure of protection varies across all partners’ (EU countries, Japan,
and the United States) pair and depend on the direction of the flow for a given
pair. Let us specify this protection structure as follows: (1 þ tij)(1 þ NTBij) 
exp [EUij þ ’EU-USAij þ  USA-EUij]. In this specification, EUij is a
dummy variable set equal to 1 when i(=j) and j belongs to EU. EU-USAij is
a dummy variable set equal to 1 when i(=j) belongs to the EU and j is the
United States. USA-EUij is a dummy variable set equal to 1 when j(=i)
belongs to the EU, and i is the United States.2
Preferences have a random component eij, and a systematic (and importer
specific) preference for goods produced in the home country, i. Sharing a
common language is assumed to mitigate this home bias.
aij  exp ½eij  ði  LijÞðEUij þ EU-USAij þUSA-EUijÞ:
Lij is set equal to one when two different countries share the same language.
When Lij switches from 0 to 1, home bias changes from i to i  .
We obtain an estimable equation from this monopolistic competition model
of trade with home bias:
ln
mij
mii
 
¼ ln vj
vi
 
 ð 1Þ ln dij
dii
 
þ ð 1ÞLij   ln pj
pi
 
 ð 1Þ½i þ EUij  ð 1Þ½i þ ’EU-USAij
ð 1Þ½i þ  USA-EUij þ ij; ð2Þ
with ij ¼ (  1)(eij  eii). Each of the dummy variables’ (exponentiated)
coefficients gives the border effect of the corresponding combination. For
instance exp ((  1)[i þ ]) is the multiplying factor of intra-national trade
with respect to international trade among the group of EU member countries.
It includes both the average level of protection of the importing country (only
2 In order to stay compact in exposition, we present the model with only one combination
(the EU-USA pair), the empirics will consider all combinations (EU-EU, EU-USA, EU-
Japan, and USA-Japan pairs).
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the NTB-related one , because tariffs have been nil in this case since 1968) and
the home bias of consumers (i). The coefficient on EU-USAij indicates the
difficulty for American exporters in their access to EU markets (also including
both a preference and a protection component). Symmetrically, USA-EUij
indicates the difficulty faced by the average European exporter when selling
its product to American consumers. The level of each of the two latter coeffi-
cients reveals the market access problems for each specified trade flow.
Comparing the coefficients permits identification of possible asymmetries in
market access. Whether this indirect evidence confirms the claims and grie-
vances of officials or public opinion on market access reciprocity can be
assessed at the global level or alternatively at the industry level.
As was notably emphasized by Harrigan (1996), there are concerns about
potential endogeneity of right-end-side variables in equation (2), since demand,
production, and prices are simultaneously determined in this model. Consider,
for instance, a positive shock in the home bias of a given country. This will
tend simultaneously to raise demand for the home product (relative to
imports), but also relative domestic output and relative domestic prices.
Indeed, an increase in home bias raises profitability of domestically based
production (everything else held equal). In equilibrium, profits will be equal-
ized through a combination of entry of new producers and/or higher local
factor prices (which translate into higher marginal cost and hence higher
prices). Empirically, this means that both vj/vi and pj/pi are likely to be
responding to a change in border barriers, in addition to the trade response
we want to estimate. Several solutions have been proposed in the literature.
Harrigan (1996) instruments outputs with factor endowments, using a reduced-
form equation valid under factor price equalization (an assumption that has
the additional convenient feature of eluding the measurement and endogeneity
issues associated with prices). However, while endowments in certain factors
can safely be considered endogenous, physical capital is probably subject to the
same simultaneity issue raised above. Another solution would be to use the
theoretical prediction of unitary output elasticity and pass the output term on
the left-hand side of the regression. Head and Mayer (2000) and Anderson and
van Wincoop (2003), among others, adopt this strategy in some of their
specifications. In both cases, border effects are not radically affected, which
simply reflects the fact that in their papers the estimated income elasticity is
quite close to one. We therefore find it preferable, as is usually done in the
literature, to allow for this additional degree of freedom on the output term.3
Concerning the price term, it is quite difficult to find an instrument with the
3 In unreported regressions, we followed this route of constraining the output coefficient
to be one. We observe a rise in the distance coefficient and therefore a fall in
estimated border effects, more pronounced for distant pairs of countries. The major
noticeable change results in lower estimated border effects for Japan as an importer,
reinforcing the results presented below. Note, however, that this constraint is here imposing
a non-negligible distance with the originally estimated coefficient on output.
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desirable features (see Erkel-Rousse and Mirza 2002, for a recent attempt).
The price variable used here goes some way in the right direction, since we
use a national price level variable rather than the industry/country-level
price (or wage if labour is the only input) variable that would be dictated
by theory. The aggregate price level is less likely to be correlated of
industry-level changes in expected profits than industry-level factor rewards
(we also experiment with different price variables in table 2, one of which –
exchange rates – was used as an instrument by Erkel-Rousse and Mirza
2002). While our coefficients seem rather robust to the endogeneity
issue, one has to keep in mind those endogeneity-related caveats when
interpreting our results.
Most papers estimating border effects recognize the fact that the overall
effect of national borders can be the result of a combination of home-biased
preferences and/or trade policy, but very few actually try to empirically assess
the part of the explanation that is more dominant. In particular, no paper (to
date) incorporates the level of bilateral tariffs in the equation. It is clear from
equation (2), that the part of ‘missing trade’ caused in reality by tariffs is
attributed to the impact of crossing national borders (those where tariffs are
implemented) and therefore is included in the coefficients on EU-USAij and
USA-EUij in this equation.
We are interested here in giving a first assessment of the different explan-
ations to the border effects. Our approach is to start with the ‘usual’ border
effects equation estimation of equation (2) without including protection or
other explanatory variables in section 3.1. Industry-level results will also be
presented without including protection measures in section 3.2 in order to
highlight the goods and partners’ combinations for which market access is
particularly difficult, independently of the causes of the difficulty. We then
include in a second step the tariff variable within a broader set of explanatory
variables incorporating proxies for NTBs and home-biased preferences in order
to see how border effects coefficients are affected. This provides us with a
measure of the weight of each class of determinant in usually estimated border
effects. This is done in section 4.
2.2. Data requirements
We estimate equation (2) in order to capture border effects characterizing each
of the possible bilateral combinations of trade partners: intra-EU trade, US to
EU flows and reciprocal, Japan to EU flows and reciprocal, US to Japan flows
and reciprocal. The needed data involve primarily bilateral trade and produc-
tion figures in a compatible industry classification. These come from the Trade
and Production 1976–99 database made available by Alessandro Nicita and
Marcelo Olarreaga at the World Bank, which compiles this data for 67 devel-
oping and developed countries at the ISIC rev2 3-digit industry level over the
period 1976–99. The original data come principally from United Nations
statistical sources, the COMTRADE database for trade, and UNIDO
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industrial statistics for production. The World Bank files have a lot of missing
values for production figures in recent years. We have largely extended the
database on this aspect using more recent versions of the UNIDO CD-ROM
together with OECD STAN data for OECD member countries, after using a
conversion table from ISIC rev3 to ISIC rev2. We also completed the trade
data, using the harmonized database of international trade from CEPII
(BACI).4 We end up with rather complete data in our sample consisting of
eight EU members (the countries that were members throughout the whole
period of the sample: Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy, Belgium-
Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Ireland, and Denmark), the United States,
and Japan for 26 industries. Relative prices are captured though a price level
of GDP expressed relative to the United States. The data come from the Penn
World Tables v.6.1.
This variable is admittedly far from the industry-level mill price required by
the theoretical model. However, it offers three advantages: first, being less
directly linked to industry-level production costs, the endogeneity concerns
are slightly lower, as explained in the preceding section; second, the availability
of this variable is larger; and last, its impact is estimated to be more consistent
with expectations. We consider alternatives to this variable and compare
results in table 2, in section 3.1, below.
The distance variable needed for the implementation of equation (2) is a
slightly more complex than usual, as our specification requires measures of
distances between and within countries. The conceptual and practical problems
associated with this issue are discussed in Helliwell and Verdier (2001) and
Head and Mayer (2002b). They primarily involve finding a consistent and
relevant way to aggregate interregional distances within and between countries.
We developed a new database of internal and external distances,5 which uses
city-level data in the calculation of the distance matrix to assess the geographic
distribution of population inside each nation. The basic idea is to calculate
distance between two countries based on bilateral distances between cities
weighted by the share of the city in the overall country’s population. The
database also contains the contiguity and common language variables used
here.
3. Results
3.1. Overall levels of market access and asymmetries
Table 1 gives results for different subperiods of regressions pooled over all
industries. For ease of comparison between the different border effect coeffi-
cients, we drop the constant of those regressions and incorporate a dummy
variable for each of the possible combinations of partner countries. The
4 http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/baci/baci.pdf
5 Available at http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm
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coefficient on those dummy variables enables the direct calculation of the
border effect on the corresponding combination. When one dummy is dropped
and the constant is kept, the overall fit of those regressions is around 0.6, in
line and even a little higher than usual in pooled industry-level gravity equa-
tions.6 The coefficient on relative production stays very stable, around 0.8,
which is quite near the unitary value predicted by theory. The coefficient on
distance is also very comparable with usual findings in gravity equations, with
coefficients ranging from 0.47 to 0.64 and no apparent sign of decrease
over time. When we take the estimate of the last period, it can be seen that
speaking the same language more than doubles trade volumes and that having
TABLE 1
Border effects between EU9 countries, Japan, and the United States
Dependent variable Ln Imports Partner/Own
Model (78–80) (81–84) (85–88) (89–92) (93–96) (97–00)
Ln rel. production 0.80a 0.80a 0.78a 0.80a 0.77a 0.73a
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Ln rel. prices 0.84a 1.44a 0.33c 0.55 0.33c 1.34a
(0.14) (0.23) (0.20) (0.36) (0.18) (0.33)
Ln rel. distance 0.59a 0.52a 0.47a 0.59a 0.60a 0.64a
(0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10)
Contiguity 0.53a 0.51a 0.50a 0.48a 0.43a 0.46a
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08)
Common language 0.67a 0.67a 0.57a 0.53a 0.65a 0.81a
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
EU9 ! EU9 3.16a 3.05a 3.07a 2.71a 2.72a 2.55a
(0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.15)
EU9 ! USA 4.11a 4.26a 3.86a 3.84a 3.70a 3.48a
(0.18) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.18) (0.20)
USA ! EU9 3.86a 3.72a 4.09a 3.20a 3.26a 3.12a
(0.31) (0.30) (0.29) (0.31) (0.32) (0.36)
EU9 ! Japan 4.37a 4.62a 4.60a 3.51a 3.64a 3.77a
(0.35) (0.32) (0.34) (0.35) (0.37) (0.43)
Japan ! EU9 4.31a 4.34a 4.63a 4.18a 4.17a 3.66a
(0.38) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.40) (0.45)
USA ! Japan 3.46a 3.21a 3.45a 2.31a 2.57a 2.82a
(0.30) (0.29) (0.29) (0.32) (0.32) (0.36)
Japan ! USA 3.46a 3.70a 3.45a 3.78a 3.55a 3.17a
(0.23) (0.22) (0.20) (0.22) (0.24) (0.26)
N 5072 6584 6303 6213 6332 6317
R2 0.930 0.919 0.924 0.919 0.911 0.894
RMSE 1.425 1.518 1.432 1.435 1.507 1.639
NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses: a, b, online and c represent, respectively, statistical sig-
nificance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. The reported standard errors take into account the co-
rrelation of the error terms for a given importer.
6 As can be seen from the error term in equation (2), the errors have a correlated structure in
our specification. We therefore use the Huber-White sandwich estimator with clusters
defined at the importer-industry-year level to correct standard errors.
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a common border raises trade volumes by 58%, everything else held constant.
The coefficient on the price term is more disappointing, with a lot of volatility
and too small implied values of . This result of low price elasticities when
directly using proxies for prices is usual in the literature (see Erkel-Rousse and
Mirza 2002, for instance).
The border effects for intra-EU trade reported in table 1 are regularly
decreasing over time.7 The European Integration revealed by this decrease in
border effects is an ongoing and successful process.8 Crossing a national border
inside the EU reduces trade by a factor of exp (3.16) ¼ 23.6 in the late 1970s,
and by a factor of exp (2.55) ¼ 12.8 in the late 1990s, which is a substantial
increase in the level of integration and matches the orders of magnitude of
preceding work (Head and Mayer 2000; Nitsch 2000; and Chen 2004, for
instance). Note that, in the most recent period, two EU member countries
speaking a common language have a border effect reduced to only 5.7.
The level of trade integration among EU countries seems unmatched in the
other combinations considered here over the whole period. Only American
exports to Japan are occasionally estimated to have an ease of access compar-
able with intra-EU trade. For instance, in the most recent period, the 12.8
figure for intra-EU flows compares with 32.5 for European exports to the
United States and 22.6 for the reciprocal flow. Flows between the EU and
Japan appear as the most impeded in our sample, while those between the
United States and Japan show lower border effects. It has been shown that the
border effect estimate is extremely sensitive to the measurement of distance
among and within countries (Head and Mayer 2002b). The spectacular result
that Japan would seem almost as open to U.S. exports as German consumers
would be to French goods might be driven by a potential overestimate of the
U.S.-Japan distance with respect to intra-EU distances. However, this issue
touches equally the estimates over time and the coefficients on Japanese
exports to the United States. The evolution and asymmetries in border effects
among non intra-EU pairs are therefore not subject to this issue and can be
considered informative in this respect.
The rather smooth and regular evolution for intra-EU trade flows contrasts
with that observed for U.S. and Japanese access to the EU as appears in
figures 1 and 2. Those figures are obtained through an estimation interacting
the border effect for each inter-Triad combination with year dummies.9 There
7 When referring to border effects, we always mean the multiplicative effect of national
borders on trade with self compared with trade with an international partner. This
corresponds to the exponential minus the coefficients (multiplied by 1) obtained on the
dummy variables defined in section 2.1
8 Furthermore, owing to the Single Market entering into action in 1993, the statistical
procedure for collection of trade flows changed (a threshold for declaration being
introduced in international trade flows) and reduced observed trade flows, whereas the
production value calculations were kept unchanged. This results in an overestimate of the
border effect starting in 1993.
9 This procedure tends to smooth the evolution of border effects, compared with year-by-year
estimates, which are more sensitive to outliers.
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is a noticeable increase in EU market access difficulties for American exporters
in the middle of the 1980s; thereafter, U.S. producers benefit from a gradual
decrease in obstacles. Japanese exporters have suffered from a constantly high
level of border effect from 1978 to 2000, with a small improvement in EU
market access in the mid-1980s reversed from the mid-1990s onward.
When we turn to the (reciprocal) European access to U.S. and Japanese
markets, it appears from our results that, although the ease of access to the
U.S. market for EU producers is substantially lower than the reverse, the gap is
narrowing over time and recently has become very small. In relative terms, the
asymmetry of EU market access evolution with third countries is even more
apparent with Japan. During the 1985–90 period, the border effect stays
constant for EU markets, but falls markedly for the EU exporters to the
Japanese market. At the end of the period, the divergence is even clearer.
Figure 3 represents reciprocity in market access between the United States
and Japan. The picture arising is clearly asymmetric with a much better
revealed access of U.S. exporters to Japanese consumers than the reverse,
everything else equal (holding constant, in particular, the respective size of
year
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Border EU9   > USA
FIGURE 1 Border effects over time between the EU and the USA
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FIGURE 2 Border effects over time between the EU and Japan
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FIGURE 3 Border effects over time between the United States and Japan
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the two economies through the relative production variable dictated by theory).
This result, although surprising when confronted with the official positions
and disputes concerning market access issues, is not isolated. Harrigan and
Vanjani (2003) show in a similar framework that the American market is more
closed to Japanese exports than the reverse and increasingly so since the
beginning of the 1990s.
A striking feature of figures 1, 2, and 3 is the apparent negative correlation
between respective bilateral border effects. Furthermore, those bilateral border
effects seem influenced by nominal exchange rates movements. Indeed, for the
European consumer, we should expect the increase of the U.S. dollar in the
mid-1980s, for instance, to have generated substitution away from American
goods and in favour of alternative sources, most notably domestic goods, thus
creating a rise in the ratio of trade with self over imports from the United
States and therefore a rise in the border effect if the exchange rate movement is
not in the equation. The exchange rate movement is, in fact, present in our
equation through the log of relative prices term (this variable exhibits, for
instance, correlations with the log of nominal exchange rate of 0.93 and 0.96
for the Germany-United States/France-Japan pairs, respectively). Note, how-
ever, that the coefficient on the price variable is very small for some periods,
denoting a low price elasticity of trade flows, which means that imports do not
seem to react significantly to overall price changes largely caused by nominal
exchange rate variation. This might be the result of incomplete pass-through of
exchange rate variations by firms and therefore an overestimate of price
volatility in our data not matched by high trade volume response. Obstfeld
(2002) states that the standard empirical result is that pass-through rate is
around 50% over a one-year horizon. Table 2 presents a sensitivity analysis
using different price variables in regressions pooled over all industries and
years, in order to search for a variable that would have a higher impact on
trade patterns. Column (1) presents benchmark results with the same price
variable as in table 1. Column (2) replaces this variable with the log of
relative wages in the considered industry, assuming that labour is the only
input of production and that the mark-up of prices over marginal cost is
constant (as is the case in this model). Relative wages have no significant
effect on trade flows. Column (3) directly uses the bilateral nominal
exchange rate in the regression. Its impact is significantly negative, but
the estimated elasticity is even lower than it is with the benchmark variable.
Our last experiment is to separate the impact of the price variable depend-
ing on the fact that the observation involves two EU countries or not. The
idea behind that distinction is that the response to price changes might be
less important inside the EU and drive the overall coefficient towards 0.
This hypothesis is supported by the results, which show a positive effect of relative
price changes inside the EU, whereas the price elasticity (accounting for non
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intra-EU observations now) is raised. Nevertheless, the price response stays at
low levels even in the latter case, probably reflecting an association between high
prices and high quality of varieties.When looking at the evolution of asymmetries
in global market access, one has therefore to keep in mind that nominal exchange
rate fluctuations can be part of the causes, in addition to the other explanations
we emphasize in section 4.
TABLE 2
Border effects in the Triad: different price variables, 1978–2000
Dependent variable Ln Imports Partner/Own
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln rel. production 0.77a 0.79a 0.82a 0.77a
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Ln rel. distance 0.58a 0.51a 0.70a 0.57a
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Contiguity 0.48a 0.55a 0.39a 0.49a
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Common language 0.67a 0.69a 0.60a 0.67a
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
EU9 ! EU9 2.87a 2.97a 2.69a 2.88a
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
EU9 ! US 3.82a 3.90a 3.73a 3.82a
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
USA ! EU9 3.54a 3.78a 3.02a 3.58a
(0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13)
EU9 ! Japan 4.14a 4.21a 3.29a 4.20a
(0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15)
Japan ! EU9 4.08a 4.50a 4.01a 4.09a
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
US ! Japan 3.06a 3.14a 2.18a 3.13a
(0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13)
Japan ! US 3.38a 3.63a 3.72a 3.35a
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Ln rel. prices 0.85a 1.05a
(0.07) (0.09)
Ln rel. wage 0.00
(0.04)
Ln bilateral exchange rate 0.07a
(0.00)
Ln rel. prices intra-EU 0.43a
(0.11)
N 37865 35340 37979 37865
R2 0.915 0.916 0.916 0.915
RMSE 1.515 1.501 1.508 1.515
NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses: a, b, and c represent, respectively,
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. The reported standard
errors take into account the correlation of the error terms for a given
importer.
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3.2. Results at the industry level
We now proceed to estimations at the industry level, in order to evaluate the
degree of symmetry of revealed trade obstacles in bilateral relationships
between the EU, the United States, and Japan for specific products. We
begin with three figures (4, 5, and 6) representing bilateral symmetry in market
access in the three different combinations pooled over the years 1978–2000.
Each of those figures represents the point estimate together with the 5%
confidence interval of the border effect in each direction of the pairwise
combination. For instance, in figure 4, the horizontal axis has all industries
covered in our sample. The grey box represents the 5% confidence interval of
the border effect coefficient faced by American exporters on European markets
(the grey dot represents the point estimate) for the considered industry. In
black (line for the confidence interval and dot for the coefficient), are the
corresponding border hindrances faced by European exporters on the
American market. In this figure, the vertical respective positions of the black
and grey dots for each industry indicate the degree of asymmetry in market
access. Results are as follows.
First, there is a positive correlation between the reciprocal market access of
different industries in each combination of trade partners, the most apparent
correlation being between the EU and Japan. This can be interpreted in terms
of endogenous protection (similar countries – like those here – protect their
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FIGURE 4 Industry-level market access between the EU and the United States: border
coefficients
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FIGURE 6 Industry-level market access between the United States and Japan: Border
coefficients
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‘sensitive’ industries in the same way, and industries tend to have the same
pattern of sensitivity in all the considered countries). An additional explana-
tion is in terms of industry characteristics (domestic preferences are more
diversified in sectors such as food, leading to a larger border effect in all
samples for this industry).
Turning to specific industries, we note that the Furniture, Plastic, Food, and
Wood industries are systematic outliers, characterized by very large border
effects in all combinations. Differences in tastes, transportation issues10 and
other factors related to distribution networks might explain this result.
Conversely, Industrial chemicals, Professional and scientific equipment and
Transport equipment, for instance, do face limited border effects in all bilateral
relationships. Overall, those three figures do not support a ‘strong asymmetry’
view such that either the EU, the United States, or Japan would impose higher
restrictions in market access to the two other partners over all goods: There
seems to be a relatively comparable number of positive and negative differ-
ences in border effects in all three figures. Also, it appears that there are only
two combinations where the border coefficient is not statistically different from
zero: imports of Professional and scientific equipment by EU members from
Japan and imports by Japan of American-produced Tobacco products. As this
example shows, there are instances of very large asymmetries in market access.
Japanese tobacco products’ exporters face a very impressive border effect on
the American market, while the reciprocal market access is estimated to be as
free as the one of domestic producers. The food industry for the U.S.-Japan
case and Beverages for EU-Japan are other examples of large asymmetries over
the whole period. This suggests that asymmetries in preferences might be part
of the explanation of revealed differences in reciprocal market access, together
with asymmetries in actual protection levels, a topic we will turn to in section 4.
Figures 7, 8, and 9 give additional information on the evolution of market
access difficulties over time. We graph the difference in border effect coefficients
for each industry in each country pair for two periods (diamonds for 1980–89
and triangles for 1990–99).11 Overall, in figure 7 we identify Furniture, Iron and
steel, Pottery, Wearing apparel, Footwear, and Beverages, among others, to be
industries more ‘protected’ in the EU (vis-a`-vis U.S. producers) than in the
United States (vis-a`-vis European producers) during the first period. However,
the asymmetry is shrinking over time for those industries. Reciprocally,
Tobacco, Wood products, Food, Printing and publishing, and Paper and
10 Those results come from industry-level regressions, and therefore, industry-specific
coefficients on distance should at least partly capture cross-industry differences in
‘transportability’ of the good.
11 Because we focus here on differences in market access estimates over time, a compact
graphical representation of statistical significance is more difficult than in figures 4, 5, and
6. Note, however, that the vast majority of the underlying estimated coefficients have
remarkably large levels of associated t-statistics. For each of the figures, the note identifies
the few insignificant coefficients.
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products markets were far more protected in the United States. Overall, the
evolution of reciprocal integration is unclear, with American markets perhaps
becoming slightly asymmetrically more open to European exporters over time,
which confirms the finding of figure 1. As far as the bilateral relationship
between EU and Japan is concerned, and considering the 1990–99 period, our
results identify a large number of industries where access to EU markets by
Japanese exporters is substantially more difficult than the reverse. This is in
sharp contrast to the preceding period, where most industries lie to the left of
the vertical line of 0 difference in coefficients. This global evolution also
mirrors the one of figure 2. Beverages, Footwear, Tobacco, Wood products,
Food, Printing, Leather goods, and Wearing apparel are among those sectors
where the access to European markets for Japanese goods has asymmetrically
deteriorated. Reciprocally, electrical and non-electrical machinery, profes-
sional and scientific equipment, rubber products, and transport equipment
are more closed markets in Japan. A similar evolution seems to exist in the
U.S.-Japan pair. In figure 9, most estimates seem to shift left, indicating a
deterioration of the relative access of Japanese exporters on the American
market. We obtain here industry-level detail from a trend already present in
figure 3.
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Furniture except metal
Iron and steel
Pottery china earthenware
Wearing apparel
Beverages
Footwear
Plastic products
Fabricated metal products
Non-ferrous metals
Rubber products
Machinery electric
Leather products
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Printing and publishing
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Petroleum refineries
Food products
Wood products except furniture
Paper and products
Tobacco
Period 1980–1989 Period 1990–1999
FIGURE 7 Asymmetries in border coefficients: (US ! EU9)-(EU9 ! US)
NOTE: All coefficients significant at the 5% level, except Tobacco (both periods), Leather (90–99,
both directions), Ind. chem. (90–99) and Prof/sci (90–99), all for the US ! EU9 direction
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The next step is to provide explanations for this variance in border effects,
which reveal difficulties in reaching consumers in a certain country from
another country. This is what we do in the next section.
4. Explaining border effects within the Triad
4.1. Possible explanations
This section aims at disentangling the different components of hindrances to
market access. Returning to our modelling framework, we find that the coeffi-
cient (multiplied by 1, for ease of interpretation) estimated on the dummy
variable JP-USAij, for instance, in the preceding section has a theoretical
counterpart of12
ðs  1Þ½lnð1þ tsijÞ þ lnð1þ ntbsijÞ þ si ; ð3Þ
where i ¼ Japan and j ¼ United States. We now use the industry-subscript s
that was omitted before for clarity, but now becomes crucial, as underlined in
–2 0 2 4
Beverages
Tobacco
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Industrial chemicals
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Plastic products
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Machinery except electrical
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Machinery electric
Prof. and sci. equipment
Period 1980–1989 Period 1990–1999
FIGURE 8 Asymmetries in border coefficients: (Japan ! EU9)-(EU9 ! Japan)
NOTE: All coefficients significant at the 5% level, except Leather (90–99, both directions), Ind.
chem. (90–99, both directions), Transport and Prof/sci (90–99, Japan ! EU9 direction)
12 In the estimations of section 3, no measure of tariffs or other protection measures have been
explicitly included in the model.
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section 3.2: much of the variance in border effects will be related to variance of
protection measures or home bias across industries. We want to introduce in
the estimated equation proxies for the different terms in (3) and measure the
resulting fall in the estimated border effect.13 We therefore need industry-level
variables for tariffs (tsij), NTBs (ntb
s
ij) and home-biased preferences (
s
i ). Note,
also, from (3) that the border effect is positively influenced by the elasticity of
substitution of the industry (s). The more homogeneous the product (high s),
the more sensitive to price differentials consumers will be, which yields a
magnified trade volume response to the same level of trade costs (should it
be protection or preference-based).
Tariffs can be measured at the bilateral level and for each product of the
HS6 nomenclature in the TRAINS database from UNCTAD. We base our
–10 –5 0 5
Pottery china earthenware
Iron and steel
Furniture except metal
Wearing apparel
Machinery electric
Prof. and sci. equipment
Rubber products
Transport equipment
Fabricated metal products
Plastic products
Machinery except electrical
Other non-metal min. prod.
Leather products
Non-ferrous metals
Other chemicals
Glass and products
Printing and publishing
Textiles
Footwear
Industrial chemicals
Beverages
Wood products except furniture
Petroleum refineries
Paper and products
Food products
Tobacco
Period 1980–1989 Period 1990–1999
FIGURE 9 Asymmetries in border coefficients: (US ! Japan)-(Japan ! US)
NOTE: All coefficients significant at the 5% level, except Tobacco (80–89), Leather (90–99), Ind.
chem. (90–99) and Prof/sci (90–99), all for the US ! Japan direction
13 An alternative procedure would use two steps, first estimating border effects coefficients and
then regressing them on the possible explanatory variables. However, this involves the
undesirable feature of using an econometric estimate as the dependent variable in the second
stage. In addition, exploiting the full dimension of the problem would require estimating
seven different border effects for each industry and year, which would result in certain
regressions having very few observations and therefore an increased volatility in estimated
border effects.
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investigation on this rather crude measurement of tariffs, namely, considering
weighted averages of MFN tariffs among the three partners. This should be a
reliable procedure for the countries under consideration, however, since they
do not have any bilateral preference schemes. Those tariffs are aggregated
from Jon Haveman’s treatment of TRAINS data (UTBC Database14) in
order to match our ISIC rev2 industry classification using the world imports
as weights for HS6 products; an extract of the data for 1999 is shown in table 3.
Even in manufactured goods, tariffs between industrialized countries are not
negligible and vary quite substantially across industries and countries
combinations.
Besides tariffs, there are other obstacles to trade imposed by governments at
the border in order to protect national industries, which will be captured by the
border effects in the above regressions. Those NTBs for which tariff equiva-
lents are difficult to compute take a myriad of different forms, from traditional
TABLE 3
Bilateral tariffs (in %) in 1999 between Triad countries
Industry US ! EU EU ! US JP ! EU EU ! JP US ! JP JP ! US
Apparel 11.8 12.6 11.8 13.2 13.2 12.6
Beverages 9.9 4.7 9.9 19 19 4.7
Food 10.2 4.7 10.2 14 14 4.7
Footwear 10.6 13.3 10.6 36 36 13.3
Furniture 1.6 2.9 1.6 4.8 4.8 2.9
Glass 5.2 5.9 5.2 2.1 2.1 5.9
Ind. chem. 4.9 4.4 4.9 3.9 3.9 4.4
Iron/steel 2.6 2.5 2.6 3.2 3.2 2.5
Leather 4.4 7.2 4.4 21.4 21.4 7.2
Mach elec 2.6 1.7 2.6 0.2 0.2 1.7
Machines 1.1 0.8 1.1 0.1 0.1 0.8
Metal prod 2.4 2 2.4 1.3 1.3 2
Misc 2.6 2 2.6 2.7 2.7 2
Nf metals 2.5 1.7 2.5 1.6 1.6 1.7
Non-metal 2.2 3.2 2.2 2 2 3.2
Oth chem. 2.1 1.6 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.6
Paper 2.9 0.7 2.9 1.9 1.9 0.7
Petroleum 2.5 5.2 2.5 3.3 3.3 5.2
Plastic 6.8 4.4 6.8 5 5 4.4
Pottery 6.8 6.2 6.8 2.3 2.3 6.2
Printing 1.5 0.4 1.5 0.2 0.2 0.4
Prof/sci 1.7 1.5 1.7 0.2 0.2 1.5
Rubber 3 2.4 3 0.5 0.5 2.4
Textiles 9.5 10.8 9.5 9.2 9.2 10.8
Tobacco 51.7 261 51.7 12.9 12.9 261
Transport 6.5 3.1 6.5 0 0 3.1
Wood 1.8 1 1.8 3.9 3.9 1
SOURCE: TRAINS converted to ISIC rev2 3-digit industries
14 http://www.eiit.org/Protection/extracts.html
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border formalities and administrative harassment to more sophisticated sani-
tary and phytosanitary measures (Fontagne´, von Kirchbach, and Mimouni
2001). We follow here Haveman, Nair-Reichert, and Thursby (2003) (using the
same source data) and divide NTBs into four categories: (1) those that have
direct price effects such as minimum import pricing, trigger prices, and variable
levies, (2) those that involve quantity restrictions such as quotas, seasonal
prohibitions, and orderly marketing arrangements, (3) those that involve qual-
ity restrictions such as health, safety, or technical standards, and (4) those that
involve a threat of retaliation such as antidumping and countervailing duty
investigations. For a given HS6 category, each NTB variable is set equal to 1 if
at least one of the underlying tariff lines in that category is subject to an NTB
and 0 otherwise. As for tariffs data, this information on NTBs is then aggre-
gated to match the 3-digit ISIC rev2 classification by calculating a frequency
index.
Within the EU, tariffs are 0 on all products since 1968. The removal of
non-tariff barriers was the goal of the Single European Act, which targeted a
vast number of observable remaining NTBs between EU members between
1987 and 1993. Our regressions will start in 1993, owing to protection data
availability, that is, after completion of the single market inside the EU,
where all government-controlled trade impediments should have been
removed. The remaining border effect for intra-EU flows are therefore
expected mainly to reflect causes other than protection. On the contrary,
trade policy measures might still have a sizeable impact for all other combin-
ations in our sample. Note that, even if actual protectionist measures are
not the only explanation for the border effects differences we want to
explain, some of the alternative explanations work in a quite similar fashion.
An important potential explanation can be found in asymmetric preferences
among consumers. For instance, EU consumers may have a particular taste
for American tobacco products, while American consumers have, on the
contrary, a particular distaste for EU goods in this industry. This type of
preference pattern would therefore dampen, everything else equal, the level
of trade from EU countries to the United States and raise the reciprocal
flow. This consequence is observationaly equivalent to an asymmetric tariff
on this good by the trading partners. Our approach here is to contribute to
the literature by assessing which part of the variance of the border effects
can be explained by simple differences in tariff rates and which part results
from other determinants and preferences in particular.
Home bias of consumers is the other important candidate explanation. We
capture the systematic preference for domestic goods (si in equation (3)) by
using the intuitive distinction between final and intermediate goods in terms of
the home bias. We suppose that preferences are more likely to be biased in
favour of domestic products when consumers rather than firms decide the
origin of the good consumed. There are opposing arguments. Wolf (1997)
suggests that border effects can be particularly strong for intermediate goods
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because of geographic clusters of vertically linked industries.15 However,
results by industry from section 3.2 tend to indicate higher border effects for
final consumption goods, and Head and Mayer (2000) find some relationship
between the magnitude of market fragmentation and the fact that the goods of
the industry are directed to final consumption. Using the United Nations
Broad Economic Categories (BEC), defined in terms of SITC Rev. 3,
Fontagne´, Freudenberg, and U¨nal-Kesenci (1996) classify the HS6 products
into four categories according to their economic use: primary, intermediate,
capital, and consumption products. We use their concordance table to calcu-
late the share of final goods in the total external demand of a Triad importer in
a given industry.16 The sign of this variable is expected to be negative.
As outlined above, high degrees of product differentiation lower the incen-
tive to substitute foreign varieties in favour of domestic ones for given trade
costs. This will result in higher bilateral trade volumes and lower border
effects. We proxy the degree of differentiation of traded goods (1/s in equa-
tion (3)) by the share of intra-industry trade in each industry-bilateral relation-
ship. This share is calculated at the HS 6-digit level following the methodology
introduced by Fontagne´, Freudenberg, and Pe´ridy (1998) that considers the
flows between two countries to be interindustry when the flow in one direction
amounts to less than 10% of the value of the flow in the other direction. Evans
(2003) also uses a measure of the intra-industry trade share in total trade to
proxy for differences in elasticities across industries, in addition to other
proxies. She finds that all variables yield consistent results, which suggests
that border effects fall with the degree of product differentiation. The variable
used in the equation is the residual share of interindustry trade, which reflects
homogeneity of products and has an expected negative sign in the regression.
Finally, concerning the FDI hypothesis, we use the bilateral stock of FDI
between each combination of the Triad. The source is the OECD database,
often used in gravity-like empirical work on FDI (Wei 2000 being a recent
example), which gives those figures from 1980 to 2000. Although this variable
lacks one dimension of our dataset (the industry level), it has the advantage of
good overall reliability across the entire period. Hillberry (1999) employs the
sectoral dimension but not the bilateral dimension, using the foreign-owned
establishments’ 1990 share of total U.S. employment in an industry.
15 Hummels (2001) shows that the tendency for firms to choose their locations so as to
minimize the need to incur the costs associated with trade across geographic barriers such as
distance or borders could explain the high coefficients on both variables in gravity models.
Hillberry (1999) confirms this hypothesis showing that the estimated border effect depends
negatively on the degree of geographic industry concentration. In Yi (2003), vertical
specialization, which occurs when regions specialize only in particular stages of a good’s
production sequence, magnifies the effects of border barriers.
16 We are assuming that this share is not different from the share of consumption goods in the
total demand, which includes the demand for domestic goods.
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4.2. Results
Column (1) of table 4 gives coefficients for a regression without any variable
intended to explain the border effect but with the sample constrained to be the
one where all the explanatory variables, except FDI, are available. This enables
a direct comparison of different coefficients when we introduce protection,
product differentiation, and home bias variables accounting for the impact of
borders on trade.
We start by introducing tariffs in column (2), in order to obtain a first
estimate of the impact of tariffs alone on estimated border effects. The first
result is that bilateral tariffs indeed impact trade significantly, even though our
sample includes tariffs that can be considered relatively low (see table 3).
Contrary to usual belief, tariffs still matter in shaping trade volumes, even
between Triad countries, despite their limited average magnitude. The estimated
price elasticity ( in our theoretical framework) ranges between 1.96 and 3.79
here, depending on the specification. This estimate of  is still lower than recent
estimates from the literature, but we have only 26 industries, where Head and
Ries (2001), for instance, estimate their  to be around 8 with 106 industries.
Second, comparing columns 1 and 2, we observe a decrease in border effects
for all combinations except intra-EU bilateral relationships17 (which do not
suffer from any tariff). Tariff barriers therefore contribute to the impact of
national borders in the expected way: they tend to raise the ratio of internal to
cross-border trade volumes. The border effects remain high, however, and
significant, pointing to other important additional explanations.
The aggregated frequency index of all NTBs introduced in column (3) also
impacts international trade negatively and significantly and yields a decrease in all
relevant border effect coefficients. The most reduced border effects are those
concerning the access to the Japanese market. This result is detailed in column
(4), which considers the different types of NTBs separately and suggests a
particular aggregation bias problem of NTB measures in this market (the most
important fall in border effect becomes the one encountered by Japanese expor-
ters in the U.S. market). The price NTBs seem to have the greater impact on trade
flows, while the quantity NTBs show a positive although insignificant coefficient.
Haveman, Nair-Reichert, and Thursby (2003) find that for the year 1993 the
average level of tariffs reduced trade flows by 5.5% in their OECD countries
sample. We find a close figure of exp (2.66  ln (1.0287))  1 ¼ 7.3%. Their
trade-reducing effect for NTBs is 8% on average; ours is 3.2%. This result of a
measurable impact of NTBs contrasts with that of Chen (2004) and Head and
Mayer (2000), who find that, inside the EU, residual NTBs at the end of the
single-market program were not significant explanations of border effects.
The share of consumption goods in the total imports of each importer in
each industry also reduces the estimated border effects, supporting our
17 The slight difference between the three first columns in the EU9 coefficient is due to
rounding.
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TABLE 4
Determinants of border effects in the Triad
Dependent variable: Ln Imports Partner/Own
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Ln rel. production 0.73a 0.73a 0.72a 0.73a 0.72a 0.71b 0.69a
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Ln rel. prices 0.72a 0.73a 0.75a 0.75a 0.77a 0.71c 0.59a
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19)
Ln rel. distance 0.66a 0.65a 0.65a 0.65a 0.63a 0.54a 0.36a
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10)
Contiguity 0.44a 0.45a 0.45a 0.45a 0.47a 0.42a 0.42a
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
Common language 0.79a 0.79a 0.79a 0.79a 0.82a 0.76a 0.24a
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08)
EU9 ! EU9 2.60a 2.61a 2.61a 2.61a 2.30a 2.18a 3.85a
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.36)
EU9 ! US 3.61a 3.45a 3.37a 3.34a 3.14a 3.03a 4.76a
(0.16) (0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.44)
USA ! EU9 3.03a 2.85a 2.76a 2.74a 2.61a 2.63a 4.75a
(0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.27) (0.27) (0.53)
EU9 ! Japan 3.64a 3.48a 3.25a 3.38a 3.14a 3.14a 4.81a
(0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.33) (0.33) (0.54)
Japan ! EU9 3.78a 3.61a 3.51a 3.50a 3.37a 3.39a 5.36a
(0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.34) (0.33) (0.58)
US ! Japan 2.55a 2.39a 2.18a 2.30a 2.04a 2.04a 4.15a
(0.29) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.29) (0.29) (0.54)
Japan ! US 3.28a 3.12a 3.02a 2.96a 2.78a 2.67a 4.85a
(0.23) (0.23) (0.22) (0.23) (0.22) (0.22) (0.52)
Ln (1 þ tariff) 2.66a 2.37a 2.79a 1.30a 0.96b 1.21a
(0.50) (0.43) (0.54) (0.42) (0.46) (0.47)
Frequency index of NTB (all) 0.85a 0.62a 0.44c 0.55a
(0.22) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23)
Frequency index of threat NTB 0.59a
(0.21)
Frequency index of price NTB 2.13a
(0.58)
Frequency index of quantity NTB 0.85
(0.65)
Frequency index of quality NTB 0.51c
(0.27)
Share of consumption goods 0.86a 0.87a 0.74a
(0.11) (0.11) (0.12)
Share of inter-Industry trade 0.61a 0.45a
(0.13) (0.13)
Ln bilateral FDI stock 0.14a
(0.03)
N 7683 7683 7683 7683 7683 7683 6122
R2 0.894 0.895 0.896 0.897 0.9 0.9 0.907
RMSE 1.552 1.543 1.538 1.535 1.513 1.506 1.451
NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses: a, b, and c represent, respectively, statistical significance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. The reported standard errors take into account the correlation of the
error terms for a given importer.
1426 L. Fontagne´, T. Mayer, and S. Zignago
hypothesis that the home bias is actually more important in the industries
characterized by a large share of final demand. Unsurprisingly, this variable
also reduces the explanatory power of tariffs and NTBs, which are generally
more important in those industries. Our proxy for the degree of homogeneity
of exchanged products, the share of inter-industry/one-way trade, also has the
expected sign. The more homogeneous the goods exchanged, the more sensitive
the consumers are to given levels of tariffs or other impediments to trade and
therefore the lower the trade flows. The degree of homogeneity of the good
exchanged is therefore also a significant part of the explanation of the border
effect, as in Evans (2003). Note that all those explanations related to actual
protection, home bias, and substitutability of goods together explain a large
part of the border effect between blocs of the Triad in the years 1993 to 1999
studied here. The part explained ranges from 32.3% for the Japan ! EU
combination to 45.7% for the Japan ! United States combination. Standard
explanations of border effects are therefore empirically important, although
they do not explain the whole of the border effect puzzle.
The stock of overall bilateral FDI has a positive impact on trade flows,
which represents a confirmation that, at such an aggregate level, FDI and trade
are complements rather than substitutes. This positive relationship supports
the Hillberry (1999) hypothesis that international transactions costs could to
be lower when the firm is multinational.18 Aggregate bilateral FDI stocks are
therefore not an explanation of border effects in our sample, although detailed
data at the industry level would be needed to confirm this result.
5. Conclusion
We investigate in this paper the ease of reciprocal market access among the
three constituent blocs of what is often referred to as the ‘Triad’ (the EU,
Japan, and the United States). Our method involves an estimation of difficul-
ties encountered by exporters located in one of the blocs when selling their
products in another bloc. Those estimates come from a structural, gravity-like,
bilateral trade equation, derived from the now canonical model of trade under
monopolistic competition. It is based on a comparison of international trade
flows with intra-national trade flows, the border effect method of assessing
trade costs recently surveyed by Feenstra (2003) and Anderson and van
Wincoop (2004). The level and asymmetry in border effects reveal the market
access difficulties in each of the bloc combinations we consider.
Our results point to important differences and asymmetries in the quality of
market access. A typical European country in the late 1990s has an average
ratio of trade with self over trade with another EU country around 13 times
18 ‘To the extent that any of the border effect is due to fixed, rather than variable costs,
multinational firms ought to have already incurred them and can benefit from returns to
scale in international trade. Multinationals may also exploit cross-border trade as a means
of reducing currency risk.’
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larger than that predicted by the model, which gives an idea of the substantial
level of fragmentation remaining in the EU. This fragmentation has largely
decreased since the late 1970s, however, and its current level is generally much
lower than in the rest of the sample. The same ratio for the United States, for
instance, in relation to imports from the EU, is 32.5. Japan appears to be
specially asymmetrically open to U.S. exports in the recent period, with a ratio
of 16.8 against 23.8 for the reverse flows, which confirms recent results from
Harrigan and Vanjani (2003). Results are also detailed across industries, and
we identify industries where each bloc has specifically high revealed restrictions
in its market access.
We show that a substantial part of those border effects can be explained by
a set of determinants that have been proposed in the literature. We use several
proxies to capture the fact that the level of border effects in a given industry
can be caused by actual protection set by governments (tariffs and NTBs),
home-biased preferences of consumers, and the degree of homogeneity of the
good traded. The set of proxies used in our regressions to capture those
determinants explains a substantial part of border effects. The explanatory
power of those variables ranges from 32.3% of the Japan ! EU border effect
to 45.7% of the Japan ! United States one. While the border effect puzzle is
not totally solved, our theory-consistent method coupled with standard eco-
nomic explanations manage to provide a good overall picture of the causes of
market access difficulties in the Triad.
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